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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN T. JOHNSON, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DONALD J. JOHNSON, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 
11110 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The Appellant in this case seeks a new trial in 
order to have the matter re-heard by the District Court 
with a view toward elimination of the award of the real 
property interest. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
There were three hearings held before the same 
L"iurt concerning this matter. The first was held on 
1 
September 21, 1967, the second on October 6 19""" 
' u1, 
and the third on November 28, 1967. The Defendant 
at each hearing was represented by Counsel; however, 
the Defendant himself did not choose to appear at the 
first or third hearing. 
A proposed property settlement agreement was 
introduced at the first hearing and signed by the Plain-
tiff upon her express understanding that Defendant 
had no real property to divide. 
At the second hearing called by Plaintiff because 
of newly acquired information that Defendant actually 
had some real property interest at the time of the first 
hearing, undisclosed even to his own Lawyer (R-59) 
the stipulation was offered by Defendant. The Court 
received the Stipulation at that time and permitted the 
taking of testimony. In this testimony, it was revealed 
that the Defendant had received a Deed from his parents 
conveying to him the undivided two-thirds (2/3) in-
terest in and to some real property located in the vicinity 
of 3400 South 9th East, which real property had an 
evaluaton of at least $26,000.00 (R-66), subject to a 
life estate in the parents. 
In the afternoon of the second hearing, each of the 
parties was advised that the Court was entering its 
Decree, substantially in conformity with the settlement 
agreement with the additional provision that the De-
fendant be required to convey to the Plafotiff an un-
divided one-fourth ( 114) interest in and to the real 
property with which he was then vested. 
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Shortly thereafter, the Defendant cancelled the 
,erdces of his third attorney and hired a fourth attorney, 
who now appears of record, (Mr. Quentin L.R. Alston). 
}Ir Alston then called counsel for Plaintiff and advised 
him that he had been retained on the case; whereupon, 
Plaintiff's attorney consented to the withholding of the 
filing of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Decree until the Defendant had had an opportunity 
to examine them and then present argument in oppo-
sition thereto. The parties voluntarily appeared before 
the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, on an November 28, 
1967; arguments were presented substantially as out-
lined in Appellant's Brief before the same Court. Not 
until then were the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Decree actually filed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff simply seeks to have the decision 
of the Lower Court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the Defendant 
on February 1, 1967. The first Answer was filed by 
DANSIE, ELLETT, & HAMMILL, on February 
8, 1967, and that counsel withdrew on February 27, 
l\lo8. Another Answer was filed by ROBERT M. 
~IcRAE, on the 6th day of March, 1967, and that coun-
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sel withdrew on the 3rd day of August, 1967. Thm-
after, until the 11th day of October, 1967, the Defendant 
was represented by VERNON B. ROMNEY. 
The facts upon which the divorce was sought were 
briefly these: 
The Defendant had left his wife and children and 
had gone home to live with his mother some five ( 5) 
years prior to the filing of the divorce. Transcript will 
show that this was a rather bizzare arrangement; in fact, 
that the Defendant had moved into his mother's bed-
room. There is really no contest whether or not the Plain-
tiff had grounds for divorce, but simply whether or not 
the Trial Court would be bound by stipulation of the 
parties or whether the Court can look to all of the facts 
to determine what could be decreed as fair and equit-
able. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT HAS BROAD 
DISCRETIONARY POWERS IN DECIDING 
MATTERS OF DIVORCE AND IS NOT 
BOUND BY AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES. 
There appears to be no disagreement whatever 
between the parties with respect to the law in the 
State of Utah as to discretionary powers of the Court. 
The law was laid down in Title 30, Chapter 3, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and the various 
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(lecisions which have followed are completely in line. 
We refer not only to the Madsen and Callister Cases, 
~ited by the Defendant in his Brief, but also to the 
more recent decisions of Mathie vs. Mathie, ( 1961), 
(363 Pac 2d 799) and to Christensen vs. Christensen, 
( 1967) ( 422 Pac 2d 534). In both of those cases, citing 
the earlier cases, the Court has stated that the stipu-
lation between the parties is not binding upon the 
Court, but should be used merely as a guide. In the 
,\Iathie Case the Court further stated that the decision 
of the Trial Court would not be upset unless there was 
manifest an abuse of discretion. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ERR IN ENTERING ITS FINAL DECREE; 
ALL THE EVIDENCE WAS BEFORE THE 
COURT PRIOR TO ANY FINDINGS, CON-
CLUSIONS OR DECREE. 
Counsel for Respondent has read the Brief of 
Appellant with great care to determine just what it 
is that the Appellant is trying to say. The Appellant 
in his brief cites the legal principles applicable and 
spends at least three pages in an attempt to get around 
them. 
'Vithout unduly laboring the issues, it should be 
stated here by way of argument, that the Findings of 
Fact, the Conclusions of Law, and the Decree as entered 
were not entered until all hearings and arguments had 
been concluded. At the hearing held before the Honor-
5 
able D. F. Wilkins on the 6th day of October, 19ti7, 
the Defendant himself was present then and was allowed 
to testify. He was allowed to state his position to-wit 
the property which came into his hands came in as hi~ 
inheritance and, apparently, as a result of some sort 
of an argument that was going on between himself 
and his sister. Just what light this can throw upon the 
matter at hand, we do not know but certainly nothing 
further could be adduced by subsequent hearing of 
the case. The Defendant was not present at the first 
hearing and no stipulation or property settlement agree-
ment was received at that time. As a matter of fact, 
it was not received until the second hearing, after 
the Defendant himself was on notice as to what was 
the purpose of the ~econd hearing-that of determining 
what additional weight should be given to the newly 
acquired property interest. At that same hearing, the 
Court not only took judicial notice of the agreement 
between the parties, but also heard the evidence with 
respect to this additional property. The Plaintiff might 
well argue that she was not given enough of his interest 
in the property and that she should, in fact, have re· 
ceived at least one-half (I/2) thereof. Simply stated, 
the Trial Court had heard all the evidence and in fact, 
had heard arguments by the present counsel prior to 
entering the Decree. We see no means by which more 
evidence or a rehashing of the old evidence could in any 
way further enlighten the Court in this matter. 
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CONCLUSION 
The law is clear with respect not only to the power 
oi', hut also to the duty of the trial court to enter its 
Decree in accordance with all the evidence before it. 
There is also no question but what there was no manifest 
abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the decision of the 
Trial Court should be affirmed. In addition, the matter 
should be remanded to the Trial Court for determina-
tion of an award to Plaintiff of a reasonable attorney's 
fee for the necessary response to this appeal and for 
costs. 
LOUIS M. HAYNIE 
Attorney for Respondent 
840 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
7 
